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INTRODUCTION
This Essay specifically addresses the conference presentations of
Professors Barak Richman and Tim Greaney, but also shares my own
views on the current state of antitrust enforcement in health care,
including current challenges and potential reforms.
In summary, both Professors Richman and Greaney seemed critical of
* Partner, Hogan Lovells U.S. LLP. Pursuant to the 2016 Symposium on Reconciling
Competition and Consumer Protection in Health Care that the American Bar Association and the
Loyola University Chicago School of Law cosponsored, I was asked to provide comments on
Professors Tim Greaney’s and Barak Richman’s presentations at the conference. I very much
appreciate the opportunity to participate in a panel discussion with these esteemed academics.
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the antitrust laws and argued that the antitrust laws failed to prevent the
level of concentration that we see in the health care industry today, or that
they are poorly suited to regulate anticompetitive conduct related to the
pharmaceutical industry. I disagree. Antitrust jurisprudence is an
enforcement tool available to state and federal agencies, as well as to
private citizens. And agencies and private citizens use these laws in
traditional and novel ways to challenge anticompetitive conduct. The
outcome of enforcement actions, however, depends in large part on the
specific facts and circumstances of each individual case. This is the
benefit of the case-based nature of the competition regulation and this
approach arguably prevents antitrust laws from having a chilling effect
on growth, innovation, and the achievement of economic efficiencies.
This Essay argues that antitrust laws are not to blame for the perceived
high levels of concentration in certain health care markets and maintains
that the United States should not abandon these laws in favor of
alternatives. The beauty of the antitrust laws is that they are applicable
to all industries (with very few exceptions), and before a court can rule
the combination or conduct unlawful, it must conduct a rigorous analysis
into the facts, circumstances, and actual or potential outcomes of
combinations or conduct at issue—there are very few bright-line rules
that apply in antitrust jurisprudence.
I. RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR RICHMAN’S PRESENTATION: THE LIMITS OF,
AND ALTERNATIVES TO, ANTITRUST IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR
One can interpret Professor Richman’s conference presentation as
arguing that antitrust law may not appropriately or adequately address
competitive concerns related to “product hopping.”1 Product hopping is
the practice of extending a pharmaceutical product’s exclusive
intellectual property rights by introducing a modified version of the
original product before (or just as) the original formulation is set to lose
its patent protection.
Professor Richman’s presentation offered
alternative solutions to antitrust law aimed to address the concerns
regarding reduced competition in the pharmaceutical marketplace raised
by this practice, including alternative regulatory, policy, or other
solutions that may be better suited than antitrust enforcement to address
this issue. For example, some alternatives to antitrust law to improve the
competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry suggested by Professor
Richman include: (1) improved administrative procedures at the United
1. Barak D. Richman, Professor, Duke University School of Law, Presentation at the American
Bar Association and Loyola University Chicago School of Law’s Symposium: Reconciling
Competition and Consumer Protection in Health Care (Sept. 20, 2016).
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States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”); (2) better regulatory
regimes governing drug substitution laws; and (3) increased pressure
imposed by health plans on physicians and patients to encourage more
cost-conscious decision making.
Although these alternatives may potentially enhance marketplace
competition, it would be misplaced to abandon the use of antitrust laws
to enforce against anticompetitive conduct. For example, the most
notable case on “product hopping” thus far is the New York Attorney
General’s case against Actavis (formerly Forrest Laboratories), related to
its product extension strategy for its Namenda product—a drug for the
treatment of Alzheimer’s disease.2 In New York ex rel. Schneiderman v.
Actavis PLC, the Second Circuit upheld the finding that Actavis’ conduct
related to Namenda was unlawful under the antitrust laws. 3 This Essay
posits that Actavis is a practical example of the successful prosecution of
anticompetitive conduct under the antitrust laws, and would suggest that
alternative approaches to regulation are neither more efficient than
antitrust laws nor better suited to prevent unlawful conduct similar to the
unlawful activity in Actavis.
A. Are USPTO Reforms Better Than Antitrust Laws?
Professor Richman suggests that the USPTO could revise its processes
to deny patents for immaterial innovations or reformulations.4
Theoretically this might work, but this Essay suggests that such reforms
are neither easily enacted nor enforced. Even if the USPTO is the right
place for these types of determinations, it is not clear whether this would
actually prevent anticompetitive “product hops.”
In Actavis, the reformulation involved a switch from a twice-a-day
immediate release formulation to a once-a-day extended release product.5
The New York Attorney General’s complaint in Actavis interestingly did
not focus on the issue of whether the extended-release (“Namenda XR”)
formulation was truly innovative or a material improvement over the
immediate-release (“Namenda IR”) formulation. In its prosecution under
the antitrust laws, the Attorney General posed that the court did not need
to reach this issue.6 Rather, the court looked at the conduct of Actavis as
2. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 642–43 (2d Cir. 2015).
3. Id. at 659 (holding that “the combination of withdrawing a successful drug from the market
and introducing a reformulated version of that drug, which has the dual effect of forcing patients to
switch to the new version and impeding generic competition, without a legitimate business
justification, violates [section] 2 of the Sherman Act”).
4. Richman, supra note 1.
5. Actavis, 787 F.3d at 642–43.
6. Brief for the Appellee, Actavis, 787 F.3d 638 (No. 14-4624), 2015 WL 1010525 (C.A.2) (“If
there were any non-pretexual, efficiency-related, procompetitive justification for defendants’
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a monopolist to determine whether its actions constituted anticompetitive
conduct under section 2 of the Sherman Act.7 The New York District
Court found that forgoing profits from sales of Namenda IR for the
purpose of constructing a barrier to entry for generics was the exact type
of conduct prohibited under the Sherman Act.8 Therefore, it was
irrelevant whether Namenda XR was a material improvement or
innovation over Namenda IR (i.e., the original formulation).9
The Namenda reformulation was arguably a material innovation from
the original Namenda IR formulation and, as a result, the current
regulations and processes of the USPTO granted additional patent
protection to the reformulated product. It is unclear whether Richman’s
suggested reforms at the USPTO can address the specific issues that arise
in the “product hopping” context without potentially curbing the
incentive for innovators to introduce new and improved versions of
legacy products. In other words, if the USPTO raises the bar for obtaining
additional patent protection for new formulations or improvements to
existing pharmaceutical products, the obvious concern is that
pharmaceutical companies would not invest in important modifications
to existing products because of a lack of adequate intellectual property
protection.
B. Are Improvements in Regulation of Drug Substitution a Solution?
Professor Richman also indicated that state drug substitution laws
should be more relaxed so that pharmacists have a greater ability to
substitute generic pharmaceuticals not necessarily AB-rated by the Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”).10 An AB rating indicates whether a
drug is therapeutically equivalent to another approved pharmaceutical
product. Although relaxing state drug substitution laws could ultimately
make it easier for generics to compete against branded drugs, particularly
when a branded company introduces a new formulation for which no
generic is yet available, changing substitution laws raises other concerns.
Most importantly, it puts the discretion in the hands of the pharmacists to
determine appropriate substitutes for the prescribed product. This would
effectively require thousands of pharmacists across the country to step
into the role of the FDA in terms of determining whether any particular
generic drug is appropriate to be dispensed as a substitute for the
exclusionary conduct, it would be weighed against the anticompetitive effects of the conduct to
determine whether [section] 2 liability is appropriate.”).
7. Actavis, 787 F.3d at 655–58.
8. Id. at 658.
9. Id. at 658–59.
10. Richman, supra note 1.
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prescribed branded drug.
C. Can Payor Pressure on Physicians and Patients Create a More
Competitive Environment for Pharmaceuticals?
Health care payors need to play a role in bending the cost curve of
health care by holding physicians and patients accountable for their
choices of providers, location for care, and pharmaceuticals. But one of
the greatest challenges in this area is the lack of transparency and
accountability in terms of who is paying for health care services and what
those services or products actually cost. Furthermore, to the extent that
health care markets are concentrated either at the provider level or payor
level, the drive to innovate is potentially stifled. For example, if a payor
enjoys a market where there is relatively little competition, then it may
not feel the competitive pressure to lower prices or create new product
designs that shift responsibility downstream to the provider or patient.
Put simply, why would a large payor worry about pressuring physicians
and patients to make better, lower-cost choices as to pharmaceuticals, if
in doing so, the payor might risk losing consumers and, in turn, market
share?
Rather than swapping out the antitrust laws in favor of merely relying
on payors to pressure physicians and patients to make better choices, we
should advocate for increased transparency in all aspects of health care,
including payors, providers, pharmaceuticals and pharmacy benefit
managers. We need better tools to educate providers—as prescribers and
referral sources—and consumers on the costs of different services or
products. And, for purposes of antitrust enforcement, we need better
tools at the agencies to recognize and credit innovative and disruptive
actors that are trying to drive improvement in the pharmaceutical
marketplace, health plan products, or health care delivery systems, and
that will shake up entrenched payors and provider systems that hold high
market shares.
II. RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR GREANEY’S PRESENTATION: ANTITRUST
AND REGULATORY RESPONSES TO DOMINANT HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
AND PAYORS
Professor Greaney’s symposium presentation suggested that antitrust
laws are important, but limited in their ability to address the issues of
payor or provider market power in health care markets that arise through
mergers or consolidation.11 He claimed that judicial errors contributed
11. Thomas Greaney, Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law, Presentation at the
American Bar Association and Loyola University Chicago School of Law’s Symposium: Antitrust
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to the current concentration levels of health systems and health plans, and
that attempts by regulators, at the state level, to regulate prices and other
competitive dynamics (e.g., quality and efficiency) through legislation
have been inadequate in stemming rising costs in health care. Professor
Greaney proposed that the better approach would be for antitrust
regulators to target the conduct of payors and health care providers with
high market shares to prevent anticompetitive behavior of these entities.
A. Has Antitrust Enforcement “Abjectly Failed to Lower Provider
Prices” Thereby Failing to Preserve Competitive Markets?
The idea that antitrust laws are solely responsible for lowering provider
rates places a very high and undue burden on the antitrust laws. Instead,
one must recognize that health care in the United States is a heavily
regulated industry, and the government itself is the largest payor. Just
scratching the surface of government regulation over health care would
reveal that: (1) the FDA is responsible for the process, review, and
eventual approval of new drug applications and new medical devices; (2)
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, along with state
agencies, regulate providers with respect to reimbursement rates for the
Medicare and Medicaid populations, and prices of pharmaceuticals for a
similar population; and (3) state insurance commissioners regulate health
insurance plans and, in certain states, the health insurance exchange
market. Because of the interplay of regulatory bodies in the United
States’ health care system, it is overzealous to blame antitrust laws for
failing to protect against increases in provider rates and health care costs.
In fact, no single regulatory regime or body of law can adequately solve
all the issues regarding pricing, quality, and competition that arise in our
health care system.
B. How Can Antitrust Laws Impact Future Consolidation?
As for antitrust laws and their enforcement, this Essay posits that there
is an important need for better tools to distinguish anticompetitive
transactions from procompetitive or neutral consolidation in the health
care field. Specifically, antitrust analysis requires tools that can more
accurately anticipate whether consolidation will lead to price increases
versus greater price competition, and tools that can predict the potential
for benefits to patients from enhanced quality or increased innovation in
health care delivery or payment methodologies.
What does it mean to develop “better tools?” In practice, when health
care providers or payors consolidate, the procompetitive rationale is
and Regulatory Responses to Dominance in Health Care (Sept. 20, 2016).
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typically related to opportunities to improve efficiency or quality in the
delivery system or scale and efficiency in the payor market. At present,
there is a lack of appropriate ways to measure and test the potential and
likelihood for these efficiencies, particularly around quality gains and
innovation. This Essay proposes that current methods for evaluating
price effects and quality impacts from consolidation need to evolve to
remain relevant in a changing health care landscape. In particular,
antitrust enforcers need to consider how to evaluate and credit arguments
of improved quality and innovation, which are particularly notable as
hospitals and physicians form more integrated delivery systems and
health plans adopt new payment models that can have a real impact on
improving health care outcomes and lowering costs.
CONCLUSION
In considering Professors Greaney’s and Richman’s presentations, I
was struck by how critical both professors were of the antitrust laws and
their alleged failings with respect to protecting competition in the health
care system. This Essay posits that the antitrust laws are not the only
factor influencing our health care system such that they can be blamed
entirely for the system’s failings. Rather, antitrust laws have played, and
will continue to play, an important role as health care delivery and
coverage continue to evolve in this country. The facts of the situation are
critical in every instance in which the antitrust laws are applied to health
care consolidations or conduct. The importance of facts in antitrust law
is evident in Actavis where the facts led the court to conclude that conduct
at issue violated the antitrust laws.12 The same can be said for antitrust
enforcement in health system consolidations—these cases and therefore
judicial decisions in this area largely turn on the facts as they fit into the
antitrust doctrine.

12. Actavis, 787 F.3d at 659–60.

